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DARE TO BE GREAT, INC!: A CASE STUDY OF PYRAMID SALES
PLAN REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION'
In the sprawling parking lot of a shopping center on the east side of
Columbus, Ohio, a young man, perhaps in his early twenties, wearing a
bright yellow suit upon the lapel of which a jewelled American flag pin
flashes in the morning sun, emerges from a parked Cadillac. He strolls
across to the mall, glancing around as though he is looking for someone.
Striding up to another young man in work clothes who has just exited
from a luncheonette, he offers his hand and introduces himself.
"Hi! I'm Jim Jones (warmly shaking hands). What's your name?"
"Fred Smith" (staring awestruck).
"I'm awfully glad to meet you, Fred. What do you do for a living?"
"I work in a machine shop" (extracting hand).
"Make pretty good money, Fred ?"
"I do OK" (shrugging shoulders).
"How would you like to earn twice as much as you're making now?"
"Sure, who wouldn't? How?"
"I don't have time to explain it to you now, Fred. Just give me your
phone number and I'll call you later and tell you all about it."
Although the reader may smile at the thought of a stranger obtaining
his telephone number so easily, Fred had no such qualm, or at least suc-
cumbed after Jim assured him that his business was legal. Jim telephoned
Fred the next evening and invited him to a Dare To Be Great, Inc!
"Golden Opportunity Tour" to be held that weekend at the Sheraton-Gib-
son Hotel in Cincinnati. Fred again asked for specifics about the com-
pany, but Jim demurred, promising that all his questions would be an-
swered that weekend. After receiving assurances that his transportation,
meals and lodging would cost him nothing, Fred agreed to come, and Jim
arranged to pick him up at 7;30 Saturday morning.
Dare To Be Great, Inc! (hereinafter "DG"), as Fred and hundreds of
other guests recruited in a similar manner will discover at the Golden Op-
portunity Tour (hereinafter "GO Tour"), operates what is known as a
pyramid sales plan. It is estimated that 200 companies in the United
States use pyramid sales plans,2 the distinguishing characteristic of which
is that in exchange for a sum of money, the participant receives both a
'The factual assertions and conclusions contained in this Note are, unless otherwise docu-
mented, the product of the writer's attendence at a Dare To Be Great, Incl "Golden Op.
portunity Tour" and numerous interviews with past and present Dare To Be Great, Inc of.
ficers and franchisees. No attempt will be made to individually cite these sources.
2 N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1972, at 59, col. 5. An estimated 35 of these companies operate
in Ohio. Interview with Robert DeLambo, Acting Attorney Inspector, Division of Securities,
Ohio Department of Commerce, in Columbus, Ohio, May 1, 1972.
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product (sometimes an inventory of product) and the right to earn finder's
fees for recruiting additional participants. Such a scheme, if successful,
produces a chain-like, theoretically open-bottomed pyramid of franchisees,
each of whom is also a potential franchisor. Due to a high rate of com-
plaints by dissatisfied investors, pyramid plans have attracted the atten-
tion of the media, the National Council of Better Business Bureaus, gov-
ernment agencies (including consumer agencies and attorneys general in
almost every state), the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal
Trade Commission and the Postal Service. Most of the scrutiny of pyra-
mid plans has focused on a single organization, Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises, Inc., a holding company with 68 subsidiaries3 including the two most
successful and most maligned pyramid schemes, DG and its sister company
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. The purpose of this Note is to investigate the
methods employed by DG to sell its franchises, in order to decide whether
or not some sort of special government regulation of pyramid sales plans is
indicated, and then to see how pyramid plans are actually being regulated.
II. DARE To BE GREAT, INC! INVESTOR RECRUITING
A. The Pyramid Structure
DG, based in Orlando, Florida, and dispersed into 15 regional centers
throughout the United States, sells a series of four self-motivation courses,
or "Adventures," which are similar in content to the familiar Dale Carne-
gie-type courses. For $300 a buyer receives Adventure I, "Self-Discovery,"
which includes 12 tape cassettes and a tape player, some supplemental
written material, and an attach6 case to hold it all. Adventure II, "Self-
Improvement," includes 12 more tapes and sells for $700. These courses
are sold by franchisees on a retail basis and are not strictly a part of the
pyramid structure. For $2000 a prospect receives Adventure Ill, which
includes Adventure II and additional motivational tapes, and for $5000 he
receives a cartridge projector and six sound films, and becomes an Adven-
turer IV. Purchasers of each Adventure also receive the privilege of at-
tending training classes which are held in their localities approximately
once a month by traveling instructors employed by DG. Adventures I, II
and III require two, twelve, and three days of classes respectively. The Ad-
venture IV course takes four days and is taught only at the District Offices.
Adventures I and II are general motivation and development courses. In
Adventures III and IV, however, the emphasis is placed on methods of
selling DG franchises. The reason for this is that the purchaser of Ad-
venture Ill or IV receives the privilege of selling Adventures I-IV to
others, thereby earning finder's fees of $100, $300, $900 and $2000, re-
spectively.' The pyramidal aspect distinguishes DG from other "retail"
3 N.Y. Times, May 8, 1972, at 35, coL 1.
4 However, if an Adventurer H recruits an Adventurer IV, he receives only $900 of the
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motivation courses. The remainder of the price of the courses, $200, $400,
$1100 and $3000, respectively, is retained by the company, which distrib-
utes part of it to the managers in the form of overrides. The first manage-
ment position in the DG sales hierarchy is that of Area Director, who is in
charge of one large city and its environs, i.e. the area encompassing sev-
eral smaller cities and towns. A District Director has charge of several
areas. Ohio, for example, contains three Districts. A Regional Vice Presi-
dent may be responsible for one or several states. The other important
position is that of instructor. The instructors travel around their regions
teaching the courses, and speaking at GO Tours. They receive in excess of
$100 per day plus traveling expenses. DG recruits all its managers and in-
structors from its own ranks. A person cannot obtain a position with DG
unless he has invested in the program and demonstrated success at recruit-
ing others.
According to the written agreement, the new investor in Adventure III
or IV does not immediately receive the right to recrdt additional prospects.
Instead, he agrees that "[ilt has . . . been explained to me that in order
for me to participate in the placement of other courses . . . I must meet
the present requirements to become an I.S.A. [Independent Sales Agent)
and I must make separate application to DARE TO BE GREAT, INC!
and be approved by them [sic]."' Although this provision of the agree-
ment is briefly mentioned at the GO Tour, it does not explain what, if any,
requirements the new investor must satisfy, nor are the prospects left with
the impression that anyone's "application" is ever rejected. According
to the Zanesville, Ohio, Area Director (formerly the Columbus Area Di-
rector), an Adventurer III is required to attend the Adventure I and III
courses and pass an objective and short-answer examination on their con-
tent in order to become an Independent Sales Trainee (I.S.T.). Prior to
completing this requirement he may sell courses, but his finder's fees will
be held in escrow by the company. An Adventurer IV must fulfill a
similar requirement in order to qualify as an Independent Sales Agent
(I.S.A.).
The worrisome aspect of companies like DG and Koscot, which has a
similar program (using cosmetics as the retail product), at least to many
government officials across the country, is that a franchisee can make
money far more quickly by recruiting new franchisees (an activity known
as "head hunting") than by selling products. These officials feel that this
"chain letter" system "can be highly profitable to those who get in early
$2000 finder's fee. The remaining $1100 is paid to the Adventur.r IV who recruited ("spon.
sored") the III, or, if he is not a IV, to the first IV up the chain. Obviously, the prospect
has a great incentive to enter as a IV, or, if he cannot initially afford the necessary $5000 in-
vestment, to advance to IV by investing the additional $3000 as early as possible.
Adventurers I and II may not presently recruit new franchisees, although they were per-
mitted to do so, at least in Ohio, prior to November 1, 1971.
5 DG "Enrollment Form" (undated).
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and disastrous to those who get in near the bottom after an area is satu-
rated with franchise holders." They also feel that the high incentive to
gain recruits exposes prospective investors to other, more direct dangers.
To determine whether or not these fears are well-founded, it is necessary to
observe closely the DG recruiting process, and to discover how the in-
vestor fares once he has entered the program. Since the GO Tour is the
primary recruiting vehide, it is also the focal point of this discussion.
B. The Golden Opportunity Tour
The GO Tour begins at 7:15 on Saturday morning, when the sleepy
prospect7 is picked up at his home by his already bright-eyed sponsor, at-
tired perhaps in a red, white and blue striped blazer set off by white pat-
ent leather boots with the jewels on his flag pin flashing. Sponsors and
guests from the Columbus Area gather in the dining room of a motel in
Delaware, a town just north of the Columbus city limits. Sponsors lead
their guests from table to table introducing everyone. The mood is jovial
and anticipatory, with much loud talking and laughter. The waitresses
too are happy, because they know from experience that these Dare To Be
Greaters are good tippers. They see them at least five times a week, since
the GO Tours leave from the motel each Wednesday and Saturday morn-
ing, and business training meetings are held each Monday, Tuesday and
Friday evening. In addition, the Adventure classes are held there when
the traveling instructors are in the city. The chartered Greyhound leaves
a bit after 9:00 a.m. and the 23 people, including 11 prospects, settle
down for the two and one-half hour ride on Interstate 71 to Cincinnati.
The Columbus Area Director's wife, a registered nurse, explains that she
and her husband, an ex-Toledo policeman, were prejudiced towards black
people until they "joined the company" and learned that blacks are the
same as whites. She tells how Glenn Turner, the founder and principal
shareholder of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., personally contributed
$50,000 for muscular dystrophy research on a Jerry Lewis telethon, and
how his example influenced other Dare To Be Greaters to give generously
to charities. The Area Director, in response to a question, says that he
never tells anyone his income. To do so would be dangerous, because if
he were to tell a prospect that he had made $40,000 in his first ten months
with the company, and the prospect joined the company and made that
much in his first six months, he might feel that he had accomplished
enough and stop working for the next four months. Sponsors roam the bus
talking with each other and with all the prospects. One quickly discov-
ers that the worst sin is having a negative attitude. "Turnerites" are "posi-
6 N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1972, at 59, col. 4.
7 DG's most commonly used prospecting tool, the "cold," oa-the-street approach, has al-
ready been illustrated. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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tive" ad nauseam. They never disagree with anyone, and always manage
to find something good to say about anyone and anything. They are as
much concerned with the attitude of everyone else as they are with their
own. The bus is filled with exclamations of "Great!, .... Fantastic!" and
"That really jacks me up!" There is a song about Vitacot, a vitamin
supplement presumably sold by a Turner corporation ("take two today,
just to be sure"), and another entitled "I've Got That Good Old Turner
Feeling Deep in My Heart." Someone blows a cavalry charge on a bat-
tered bugle, after which everyone is supposed to shout "Columbusl"
The purpose of all this, of course, is to show the prospects how happy
and "positive" Dare To Be Greaters are, how everybody likes everybody
else, and to begin to instill a group spirit, a sense of belonging, in the
prospects. The bus pulls in at noon. The Sheraton-Gibson, an old, es-
tablished hotel, is just off Fountain Square, across the street from a large,
new Brooks Brothers branch, an art gallery, and other trappings of re-
spectability. There is an hour for the guests to see their rooms, comb
their hair, perhaps have a quick lunch in the hotel coffee shop. Check-
in and luggage handling is supervised by the Columbus GO Tour Chair-
man, a young, attractive ex-waitress. She is engaged to the Area Co-
ordinator, who used to be an apprentice electrician before his fiancce
brought him into the program. Both positions, although non-remunera-
tive, are coveted, since their occupants are promising franchisees being
groomed for Area Directorships.
At one o'clock the ballroom, equipped with a low, portable stage and
rows of wooden chairs, is jammed with 600 or 700 people from all over
Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee. Last week there were reportedly twice
as many, but this week Michigan is opening its own GO Tour center.
There are more prospects than sponsors, and the groups can be differenti-
ated by their name tags, red for prospects, and a symbolic green ($) for
sponsors. Some of the male guests (many guests are women) are not in
coat and tie. All of the sponsors, many of whom are women, are appropri-
ately attired. Many sport wardrobes from another Turner enterprise, the
House of Glenn-bright reds, greens, yellows-but most are more conserva-
tively dressed. There is a palpable air of excited anticipation which be-
comes a gathering chant of "Go, Go, Go" when the master of ceremonies
takes the stage. He lets the chant build until it reaches its crescendo, then
swings his arm back like a baseball pitcher and hurls his fist into the air, so
that the final and loudest "Go" exactly coincides with the gesture. Every
"Go" chant is ended in this manner rather than being allowed to tail off
into a few last, feeble "Go's." After a recitation of the Pledge of Allegi-
ance, the first speaker is introduced. In the manner of Glenn Turner, and
all subsequent speakers, he makes his entrance by sprinting up the cen-
ter aisle and leaping into the arms of the previous speaker for a prolonged
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embrace; Dare To Be Greaters are not afraid to display their affection for
each other. The speaker, an enthusiastic young man with a pronounced
Tennessee accent, launches into an obviously memorized, short talk," the
purpose of which seems to be to warm up the audience for the second
speaker, who is the Ashland, Kentucky, Area Director. He runs up the
aisle and embraces the first speaker to enthusiastic applause, culminating
in a "Go" chant. In his "canned" speech he tells the guests, step by step,
how they can earn $40,000 in ten months, part time, by investing $5000 in
DG and recruiting other franchisees. Each time he pauses to erase the
blackboard, the audience, led by the sponsors, begins a "Money Hum."
Everybody hums until the fist-in-the-air signal comes from the speaker, who
has by this time finished erasing the board, at which time everybody yells
"Money" at the top of his lungs. After each "Money Hum," the Areas
do their "Area Cheers." Dayton, Cincinnati, Canton, Columbus, Lexing-
ton, Ashland, Nashville, etc. each has its own unique cheer. Columbus,
of course, does its bugle charge which was practiced on the bus. Spon-
sors urge their guests and guests of other sponsors to join in the various
cheers, chants and hums to become part of the group. The reason for the
"Money Hum" could be that these Dare To Be Greaters don't want the
prospects to have those few seconds, during which the speaker is erasing
the board, to have negative thoughts about what the speaker just said, to
think that perhaps he can't do as wellas the figures on the board say he can.
Or, the "Money Hum" could simply be an interest-maintaining device to
keep the prospects attention focused on the speaker. The speaker goes on
to tell about a woman in Wisconsin who earned $16,000 in her first month,
and about a man who earned $50,000 in one month.
Now come the featured speakers, the Canton, Ohio, Area Director, the
Tennessee District Director and a National Instructor. Their speeches are
not "canned," and they are very good at what they are doing. They make
no attempt to disguise their purpose, the purpose of the GO Tour. They
tell the prospects again and again, "We're going to get your check!" The
way they go about doing this, and they do it remarkably well, can only be
described as brainwashing. For five hours on Saturday afternoon, with
only a 20 minute break, for six hours that night with no break, and for
five solid hours on Sunday afternoon, professional salesmen brainwash
the prospects with the "Turner Philosophy." This is not a mere pitch
to the prospect that he can make a lot of money selling DG franchises; it
is an actual philosophy, which is why it takes an entire weekend to present.
The chief exponent and example of this philosophy is Glenn W. Turner
himself, who is adulated, if not deified, by his followers. These super-
salesmen of the GO Tour are his disciples. The message is that every per-
8 The script of his speech, as well as much of the GO Tour, is set down in the DG Train-
iag Manual.
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son has within him the potential to be great, but that he will never be great
until he believes that he can be. Ninety-five percent of the people in this
country have been "programmed" all their lives by their well-meaning par-
ents, relatives and friends to believe that they will never make more than
$10,000 a year, that they are just average, and that they have to work for
somebody else all their lives to make a living. DG conducts GO Tours be-
cause two days are needed in order to re-program prospects to believe that
they can succeed if they believe they can. For two days, out of the mouths
of the professional speakers and from Glenn Turner himself, on film, the
message pounds at the prospects: "All things are possible to him who be-
lieves;" "What does it take to become a success? Believing in yourself;"
"Making a million dollars was easy. What was the hardest thing in the
world was believing I could do it;" "I challenge you to take back your
mind;" "If people tell you enough that you can do it, you can do it;"
"Glenn Turner believes in the people. He believes that you are great. He
founded DG to make money, yes, but his real reason was to give people
a chance to realize themselves;" "If Glenn Turner, harelip sharecropper's
son with an eighth grade education, can do it, anybody can do it;" "Glenn
Turner has dedicated his life to helping people. He has given away over
20 million dollars to charitable organizations. His greatest aim in life is to
wrap this world in love, peace and understanding;" "This corporation is
dedicated to your success;" Turner-"What makes me happy is turnin' on
people."
But there is more than just this Norman Vincent Peale-Dale Carnegie
"positive thinking" pitch. There is a call to what amounts to class revolu-
tion, and it strikes a responsive chord. Turner-"Two percent of the peo-
ple in this country control one-third of the wealth;" "You're puppets on a
string and people are jerking them;" "I formed this company to bring this
country away from the mass corporations back to the people;" "We are
criticized because we are an organization of people, and the people don't
own this country anymore; the politicians and businessmen do, and we are
a threat to them;" "This is a movement of people;" "We have half a mil-
lion people and we're looking for a hundred million more, to give Amer-
ica back to the people;" "I don't know of any company in America that
has been attacked like this company has been, because we give people
hope;" "They have your mind but they haven't got your heart." On Sun-
day afternoon, the ballroom lights are dimmed and the prospects hear a
recording of Glenn Turner talking about his corporation of people while
the Jordannaires, a country-western group, sing "Glory, Glory, Hallelujah"
in the background. This moment is symbolic of the entire weekend's ap-
peal to the prospect to invest $5000 for everything that is good-religion,
country, family and himself.
But the potential franchisee is not asked to do it alone; in Turner
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Enterprises, everybody helps everybody else. One Area Director who
spoke said that, although he made $7000 in his first week, he didn't earn
it, because his sponsor and other sponsors did the work-all he did was
bring some guests to a GO Tour. The Turner message, however, is not
simply that everybody helps everybody else to make money; the message
is to love people. "We talk about money to get your attention. What we
are really talking about is helping people. Money is secondary." This, of
course, is potentially the cruelest of the misrepresentations (if that is what
they are) because it appeals to people who are lonely and who need to feel
loved and accepted. It is those same people who will suffer most if they
later become disillusioned. "Most of you have more friends here than
you've had in a lifetime." "I came into this company to make money and
then I found out what it was all about-helping people." This appeal to
the prospect to join a group where he will be loved and appreciated is rein-
forced by the sponsors who appear united in their desire to help him, and
they feed his ego in any way they can, especially by telling him how great
he is.
The GO Tour speakers do not deemphasize the importance of hard
work to success in DG; in fact, they stress the importance of work.
"There's no free lunch. If you're looking for something for nothing,
you're not going to find it here." "As ye sew, so shall ye reap." "We
spell 'luck' w-o-r-k." Prospects are never told, however, of what all this
work consists. They are told that they must "prospecte to find people to
bring to GO Tours, take care of their guests on the tours, and get their
checks, which includes going to the bank with the prospect when he bor-
rows the money to invest.
In addition to examining the substance of the Turner message, it is il-
luminating to look at the packaging techniques by which the message is
sold to the prospects. Iost obviously, the flaunting of apparent wealth
-the Cadillacs, the outrageous suits, the roll of $100 bills which many
Dare To Be Greaters frequently display-is intended to persuade decep-
tively the prospect that all the franchisees are making money hand over
fist. The sponsors' friendliness with and flattery of their prospects have
previously been discussed. Related to these is the creation of group spirit
and the appeal to the prospect to join the group, to belong to the DG fam-
ily. Intermingled with this "group" appeal is the revival-like spirit which
pervades the entire two days-the speakers' running to the stage, the em-
braces, tears and kisses, the seemingly compulsive handshaking and back-
patting, the testimonials of old and new franchisees about how the com-
pany has changed their lives, the songs, hums, cheers and chants, the adula-
tion of Glenn Turner and the enthusiastic response to the speakers.
Another selling technique which appears to work well is aimed at over-
coming the objections, or potential objections, of the prospect's wife.
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First, most sponsors make every effort to have the prospect's wife accom-
pany her husband on the GO Tour, for the obvious reason that a prospect
who attends the GO Tour alone may emerge "Tumerized," but then go
home, only to be dissuaded by his "negative" wife. At the GO Tour the
speakers invoke the promises of material success (home, car, vacation,
etc.) presumably made by the husband to his wife when the couple were
planning their lives together, and they ask the husbands rhetorically how
many of those promises they have fulfilled. They then launch into an ex-
hibition of statistics purporting to show that the prospect will more likely
than not be "dead broke" at retirement age, that he will have spent all his
life "spinning his wheels" and never succeeding. The alternative, of
course, is to invest $5000 in DG and make $40,000 a year part time. "We
dare you to take that first step to achieve your dreams. We dare you to be
great. You are as great as you dare to be." The wife, meanwhile, is
urged by both the male speakers and wives of sponsors to refrain from
attempting ,to dissuade her husband from investing in the company, even
if she is not sure that it is a good investment. She is urged to let him be
the boss and make the decisions, and then support him in his decision, be
"behind" him. Wives of Area and District Directors take to the stage to
exhort wives not to hold back their husbands because of a desire for se-
curity.
Another feature of the sales pitch is to say the "good" things over and
over, but to mention the "bad" things only in passing and quickly shift
back to the "good" things. The prospect of making vast sums of money
by recruiting new franchisees is continuously drummed into the guests'
heads. There is the basic blackboard demonstration of how, working only
part time, he can make $40,000 in ten months' time by recruiting only two
new franchisees a month at $2,000 a head. All weekend he hears testi-
monials of and references to people who it is claimed have made and are
making huge sums of money. On Saturday afternoon each Area reports
its receipts since the Wednesday-Thursday GO Tour. These amounts are
totalled up on the blackboard.9 On the other hand, the prospect is told
only once, quickly, that his finder's fees will be held in escrow until he com-
pletes the required courses and is "approved by the company." He is not
informed at all that, as a franchisee, he will necessarily incur significant
out-of-pocket expenses, most notably those of transportation, food and
lodging for his GO Tour guests, and his share of the rent for facilities for
business training sessions and Adventure schools.10 In addition, prospects
9 The half-week's total announced at the GO Tour attended by the writer was $133,200.
One Area Director stated that Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee together gross be-
tween one quarter and one half million dollars per week.
10 For example, a Columbus area sponsor pays $70 for himself and each of his GO Tour
guests. If he brought two people to a GO Tour, either two single people or a couple, it
would cost him $210. This includes round trip bus transportation imd meals and lodging at
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are not warned that a time may come when their area is saturated and there
are no more prospects, which would render worthless the franchise to re-
cruit new franchisees.
Another technique used to persuade the prospect to invest his $2000 or
$5000 is the very openness with which the company and the sponsors
pursue the goal of "getting that check." During the Saturday speeches the
speakers frequently warn the guest that "We're going to get your check, so
you might as well make up your mind." There is even a "Get the Check"
chant which is frequently repeated. The Dare To Be Greaters are not
ashamed of asking for the check because, they say, the new franchisee is
not investing in the company, but in himself. The theory is that a per-
son who has not been successful in the past will not become successful un-
less he commits himself by a kind of "leap of faith." "You ask why should
you invest in Dare To Be Great just to go to work for it. We ask you to
put up so that you will put out. You are being challenged to do what you
have never done." When questioned about the high cost of a franchise,
one officer explained that a "negative" person would not work unless he
had invested heavily. A large investment is necessary, he said, to motivate
a person to change himself out of fear of losing his investment.
Another method used to allay the prospective investor's fears and
skepticism is "identification" with the prospect. Every speaker, all of
whom have presumably achieved financial success through DG, tells of
his introduction to the company, and how he felt the same way that the
prospects are feeling now. In that way, he brings all their skepticism out
into the open and then attempts to dissipate it. He tells them that he
too, only a short time ago, was a dissatisfied gas station attendant, school
teacher, or factory worker when he attended his first GO Tour, that he
too wanted to believe what the speakers were saying but was afraid
that it was a big "con game," that he too thought all the people who were
jumping up and down and screaming "Money" and "Get the Check" were
crazy, and that he too thought himself too "dignified" to join in the fun.
One spealker made explicit his identification function when he said that:
"I'm here for one reason-to be a mirror reflection of yourself."
Further methods of selling the company include, among others, the
extremely long meetings, which are psychologically debilitating and can
wear down the prospect's resistance, the aura of corporate respectability
with which the company attempts to clothe itself,11 the films of Glenn
the hotel. Each Columbus area franchisee must also pay for his share of the expense of
renting the morel facilities used for business training meetings and Adventure schools.
The former Columbus Area Director explained that although the GO Tour speakers do
not disclose these and other expenses to prospects, he directs sponsors in his Area to fully
explain them to prospects before they agree to invest A Columbus franchisee indepen-
dently confirmed this policy, although she said that such had not been the policy under the
previous Area Director.
'
t The prospect is told that Turner Enterprises controls 70 corporations and plans to de-
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Turner himself addressing a GO Tour and discussing his philosophy on
the grounds of his Florida estate, the "bandwagon" appeal ("last night in
Detroit 100 percent of 450 people joined"), and testimonials of pros-
pects who have just made up their minds to join the company. These
testimonials, which begin late Saturday night and continue on Sunday, are
reminiscent of the "witnessing" at the end of a revival meeting, when
the new converts, one by one, come to the front of the hall and proclaim
their new-found faith. One person after another tells how the events of
the weekend have inspired him and given him the belief that he can be-
come successful and help other people succeed. Many people say that
what most impresses them is the friendliness and willingness to help of
the people in the program. These converts are a strange melange, young
and old, broke and financially secure, high school dropouts and college
graduates, "freaks" and "straight" people. Seeing the diversity of back-
grounds of these new (and old) Turnerites, one begins to wonder if per-
haps a great many people are not discontent with their lives.
C. Fate of the Investor
After the prospect has come up with the required $2000 or $5000, how
does he fare with DG? It is apparent that most of those who invest in
DG never recoup their investment, and many lose more than their original
investment because they are persuaded to spend more money for Area
"dues," GO Tour expenses, new clothing, and leasing or purchasing a new
automobile. Additionally, although the franchisees are initially sold on
the program as a part-time venture, most are later persuaded or decide
to quit their jobs to devote full time to Turner Enterprises, thereby losing
the income from their former jobs.
The experience of one unsuccessful investor illustrates the fate of most
people who enter the program. A week before he was honorably dis-
charged from the Air Force in October, 1971, this 24 year old high school
graduate was leaving a "job fair" in Columbus which he had attended
in the hope of getting a job on his return to civilian life, when he discov-
ered a DG flyer on the windshield of his car. Curious, he telephoned the
sponsor who had left the flyer and attended an Adventure Meeting with
him that evening at a north side motel.'2 The Adventure Meetings, which
are miniature GO Tours employing mostly local talent using a script pre-
scribed by a DG training manual, were previously held in Columbus five
nights a week, but have been discontinued, perhaps because they were not
velop 500 more in the next year, both here and in other countries. The functions of these
existing and planned corporations are not disclosed.
12 He is the only person interviewed who was prospected by a flyer. The usual method
is "cold" canvassing by teams of two or more franchisees in shopping centers, on the street,
or virtually anywhere. A gas station owner was recruited by a franchisee who had stopped to
buy gasoline. Another person was prospected while installing a phone in a franchisee's apart.
ment.
(Vol. 33
FRANCHISE SYMPOSIUM
as successful as the GO Tours in selling prospects.13 The airman was un-
favorably impressed with the "phony enthusiasm" of the meeting and
walked out after his sponsor attempted to sign him up. During the next
two weeks his sponsor and other franchisees harassed him with univited
visits to his new place of employment and late night telephone calls to his
home.' 4 Wavering, he finally decided to invest in the company, relying
in part on his sponsor's oral misrepresentation that he could rescind the
agreement within thirty days of its execution.' Unlike most investors,
who must borrow the money,'" he had saved enough from his Air Force
pay to write a $5000 check. He quit his new job almost immediately
to devote full time to the hectic schedule of the DG franchisee-team
prospecting during the daytime, Adventure Meetings for prospects Mon-
day through Friday nights, training sessions two nights a week after the
Adventure Meetings, a GO Tour every weekend, and "follow-up" of pros-
pects during the remaining time.'
Before he invested, his sponsor had assured him that the company paid
the GO Tour expenses, and had not informed him of the other necessary
expenses of being a franchisee.' 8 After approximately two months, he
had recruited no new franchisees, but he had spent an estimated $2500
on GO Tours, "dues," and miscellaneous expenses, in addition to his $5000
original investment and the opportunity cost of not receiving income from
the job he had quit.' All he had to show for his investment in DG was
a briefcase full of tape cassettes and a depleted savings account. Many
investors are still less fortunate, since they are left with a loan to repay.
13 Unfavorable publicity generated by a series of radio shows aired by Donald Moffar, the
WOSU (Columbus) Radio Ombudsman, and articles in the Columbus Dispatch probably
played a part in the decision to discontinue the Adventure feetings. The adverse publicity
also helped undermine the morale of many of the Columbus Dare To Be Greaers. There
were approximately 30 active franchisees in Columbus during the fall of 1971, but no more
than ten were active by early 1972. Other areas in Ohio, notably Dayton and Canton, have
many more active franchisees.
14 Such badgering of recalcitrant prospects appears to be standard procedure. Those in-
terviewed said that they were trained to hound a prospect until they had his check.
15 Two weeks later, when he attempted to exercise his supposed right of recission, he
was laughed at. According to other investors interviewed, many people have been induced
to invest in DG by this same false representation, although it is apparently not practiced in
Columbus at the present time.
'
6 Every interviewee stared that DG trains its franchisees to advise prospects to disguise
from the bank or other lender the true purpose of the loan, in order to maximize the chance
of obtaining it. Franchisees are also told to accompany the prospect to the bank when he
applies for the loan and when he picks up the check.
7 One franchisee said that his nightly absence during the three months of his asso-iation
with DG almost mined his marriage.
U This is a universal complaint of disenchanted DG investors. But rcc note 10 wpr.
1o None of the disenchanted investors interviewed has made enough money from finder's
fees to cover even his expenses, let alone his original investment. With one or two possible
exceptions, apparently none of the Columbus franchisees has made a profit.
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III. EFFORTS To REGULATE PYRAMID SALES PLANS
As the number of dissatisfied investors mushroomed,2 ' it was inevitable
that regulatory agencies would move against DG and similar pyramid
plans. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the attorneys gen-
eral or consumer protection agencies of almost every state have thus far
initiated some kind of legal action against either Koscot or DG or both.21
20 Turner alone claims to have 400,000 investors in Koscot and DG. N.Y. Times, Aug.
31, 1972, at 45, col. 5.
2 1COUNCIL OF BErT BUsINESS BUREAUS, INC., REPORT (untitled) (1972), under
cover of memorandum dated May 9, 1972, is the most recent in a series of such reports
which summarize state actions against Koscot and DG. This extremaly useful report, which
also contains the names and addresses of agencies involved, is summarized here as follows:
Ala.-Koscot and DG under investigation; Alas.-Koscot under inveatigation; no action con-
templated against DG; Ariz.-Koscot assured discontinuance of false and misleading repre-
sentations; action filed against Koscot and DG to enjoin pyramid sales and to secure restitution
to investors; Ark.-Koscot entered into consent judgment in which it agreed to stop pyra-
mid sales and make refunds to investors; preliminary injunction obtained in action under new
consumer protection statute seeking restitution to investors; Cal.-Koscot and DG under in-
junction prohibiting pyramid sales (see text accompanying notes 98-105, inlra); Colo.-action
against Koscot under Securities Act pending; DG under investigation; Conn.-by stipula.
tion, Koscot and DG are prohibited from selling franchises; action for fraud and misrepre-
sentation pending- Del-no action against Koscot contemplated; DG enjoined from doing
business until it complies with state's "investigative demand"; F/a-Koscot entered into con.
sent judgmenr, Glenn Turner under indictment for conspiracy to violate securities and lot-
teries laws: Ga.-no action contemplated against either Koscot cr DG; Hawai--informal
negotiation with Koscot; no action comtemplated against DG; Idaho-Koscot under investi.
gation; DG under preliminary injunction based on Securities Act; DG under injunction based
on Consumer Protection Act; ll.-Koscot consented to judgment prohibiting multilevel sales,
misrepresentations, etc.; DG under investigation; lnd.-Koscot enjoined from doing busi.
ness other than by way of revised marketing plan found not to viDlate Securities Law; under
temporary restraining order (hereinafter "TRO") prohibiting operations; DG under investi-
gation; Iowa--Koscot enjoined from multilevel sales; DG under investigation; Kan,--Koscot
enjoined from doing business, ordered to refund approximately $600,000 in initial invest-
ments; DG under TRO prohibiting further activity in action charging violations of securities,
lottery, chain referral, deceptive practice, and proprietary school statutes; Ky.-Koscot assured
compliance with lotteries, gift enterprises and chain merchandisng statutes; DG under in-
vestigation; La.-no action contemplated against DG or Koscot; Al.-Koscot agreed to con-
sent judgment prohibiting deceptive and fraudulent practices and ordering restitution to in-
vestors who relied on misrepresentations; DG agreed to consent judgment prohibiting further
business and ordering restitution; Md.-Koscot under surveillance after cease and desist
order for violations of Securities Act withdrawn; decision awaited on hearing before Mary-
land Board of Education to determine whether DG must be lic.nsed as an educational pro,
gram; Afass.--Koscot agreed to consent judgment prohibiting deceptive practices, etc.; TRO
prohibits Koscot and DG from engaging in business other than retail sales, places assets In
temporary receivership; Mich.-appellate court, holding that Koscot marketing plan violated
deceptive advertising and lottery statutes, enjoined pyramid sales and advertising found to
violate deceptive advertising statute; no action contemplated against DG; Minn.-Koscot
under preliminary injunction prohibiting sale of distributorships in action charging viola-
tions of securities, antitrust, consumer fraud, false advertising, and pyramid sales statutes;
consolidated for trial with private class action brought on belalf of all Koscot distributors;
in similar action, TRO prohibits DG from transacting business of any kind; Miss-,Koscot
and DG in process of negotiating consent judgment; Mo.-Kos(ot and DG consented to judg-
ment prohibiting "a multitude of practices;" Koscot under TR() in subsequent civil contempt
action; Afon. -Koscot and DG under investigation; action contemplated; Neb.-Koscot and
DG under investigation; Nev.-Koscot and DG negotiating consent judgment; N,.-Sepa.
rate actions filed against Koscot and DG requesting injunctions prohibiting deceptive prac-
tices and misrepresentations, and ordering restitution to investors who purchased franchises
as a result of such practices; N.J.-Koscot under preliminary injunction prohibiting viola.
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The actions usually have been based on one or more of three theories: (1)
the sale of a franchise is the sale of a security, and therefore the companies
must either cease operating or comply with federal or state securities laws;
(2) sales of franchises are accomplished by various false or misleading
representations which allegedly violate various consumer protection stat-
utes; and (3) the pyramiding of franchises constitutes an illegal lot-
tery or "endless chain,122 also in violation of a specific type of consumer
protection statute. The purpose of this section is to illustrate the applica-
tion of statutes relating to consumer fraud, antitrust, misrepresentation, deceptive practtces,
and failure to disclose information; DG enjoined from doing business, ordered to make re-
funds to all investors; N.f.-no action contemplated against Koscot or DG; M.1%-Ko:co,
and DG consented to judgment, Koscot appealed and lost in App. Div.; on appeal to Cr. o-
App. (See text accompanying notes 91-97, infra); N.C.-consent judgment prohibits Koscot
from selling distributorships; preliminary injunction prohibits DG from operating pyramid
scheme; N.D.-Koscot and DG under TRO in action for injunction; rstitution -sought, Ohio
-Koscot enjoined from selling distributorships in action based on Securities Act; similar ac-
tion filed against DG; TRO obtained in separate action under new Consumer Sales Practices
Act (see text accompanying notes 54-90 and 106-16, infra); Okla.-Koscot and DG under
investigation; Ore.-Koscot consented to judgment prohibiting misrepresentations, limiting
number of distributorships; in assurance of voluntary compliance, DG agreed not to violate
Oregon law, to limit number of franchisors, to refrain from paying excess commissions,
from making false and misleading statements, and to make certain refunds; in action brought
seeking permanent injunction and restitution, preliminary injunction prohibits DG from sell-
ing franchises; State Corporation Commissioner has sued DG charging sale of unregistered
security; Pa.-Koscot signed assurance of voluntary compliance under which investors can
obtain 45 percent refund; Koscot enjoined from referral sales and misrepresentation; DG en-
joined from referral sales, misrepresentation of earnings, and deceptive practices; in subse-
quent civil contempt action, preliminary injunction directs DG to suspend all activities; R.
-Koscot and DG entered into "hold harmless agreement" under which any investor can ob-
tain full refund if he suffered by misrepresentations; preliminary injunction prohibits all but
retail sales; S.C.-Koscot and DG under investigation; S.D.-Koscot entered into consent
agreement under which it will limit number of distributorships and eliminate referral sales;
DG under investigation; Tenn.-although state has a Pyramid Sales Scheme Law which pro-
vides criminal penalties, no action aginst Koscot is contemplated as far as Attorney Gen-
eral's office is aware;, in prosecutions of DG personnel, Pyramid Sales Scheme Law held un-
constitutional (on appeal to Supreme Court of Tennessee); Tc .-- in action alleging that
Koscot is selling unregistered securities, the Securities Commissioner lost on appeal; In sepa-
rate action, TRO prohibits pyramid sales, misrepresentation of earnings, ease of recruitment,
conducting a lottery, etc.; civil contempt action seeks $160,000 for violation of TRO; in
separate action, TRO granted prohibiting violation of Proprietary School Act, Utb--Koscor
under investigation; action filed charging DG with operating illegal lottery, and requesting
injunction and rescission of all contracts; Vt.-action against Koscot contemplated; prelimi-
nary injunction denied in action against DG to enjoin sale of franchises; new Trade Rule
prohibits chain distributorship schemes; Va.-Koscot under investigation; preliminary injunc-
tion prohibits DG from operating pyramid sales scheme; separate action pending for restitu-
tion to investors; WVash-Koscot under investigation; DG entered into consent judgment
based on Proprietary School Registration Act and Consumer Protection Act, which provides
for refunds to investors induced to invest by misrepresentations; over $300,000. refunded so
far, W. Va.-no action contemplated against Koscor, DG under investigation; 117 is.-Kocot
enjoined from selling distributorships, etc; in separate action under Pyramid Sales Act, pre-
liminary injunction prohibits sale of distributorships; no action contemplated against DG;
Wyo.Koscot and DG under investigation; P.R.-action filed against Koscot seeking to en-
join misleading practices, to void contracts obtained through misrepresentation, and to pro-
vide restitution to investors; DG under investigation; V.1-no action contemplated against
KoscotorDG; D.C.-Koscot and DG under investigation.
2 2 Td.
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tion of these theories to pyramid schemes by examining regulatory efforts
in several jurisdictions.
A. The "Securities" Theory: Federal and State
The Securities and Exchange Commission has declared that the opera-
tion of pyramid sales plans, the common element of which it defines as
"a sales pitch which stresses the amount of money a participant can make
on the recruitment of others to participate in the plan,"2 often involves
the offering of an "investment contract" or "participation in a profit shar-
ing agreement," both of which are securities as defined in the Securities
Act of 1933.24 The Commission believes that "a security is offered or sold
where the franchisee is not required to make significant efforts in the oper-
ation of the franchise in order to obtain the promised return." 5  This
occurs where "prospective participants are led to believe that they may
profit from participation . . . without actually assuming the significant
functional responsibilities that normally attend the operation of a fran-
chise.... ,2 The Commission emphasizes that
the assignment of nominal or limited responsibilities to the participant
does not negative the existence of an investment contract; where the duties
assigned are so narrowly circumscribed as to involve little real choice of
action . . . . a security may be found to exist.27
According to this reasoning, DG and Koscot franchise agreements are in-
vestment contracts, since the standardized recruiting scheme, using the GO
Tour as the crucial selling tool, leaves little choice for the franchisee, who
is relegated to a distinctly secondary role. Although he is a prospector and
sometimes a closer, his contribution to the recruitment of franchisees is
minor in comparison to that of the company-produced GO Tour.
The Commission recognizes that the test for an investment contract
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the leading case of SEC v. I". J.
Howey Co.2 seems, on its face, to contradict the Commission's decision
that a company like DG is selling securities. In Howey, the Court stated
that: "[t]he test [for an investment contract] is whether the scheme in-
volves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others." 9  The Commission admits argu-
23 SEC, APPLICABnrY oF T SEcuRIEs LAws TO MULTLEVEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP
AND PYRAMID SALES PLANS 1 (Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5211; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Release No. 9387) (Nov. 24, 1971) [hereinafter ited as SEC RELEASE]. DG
and Koscot undoubtedly come under this definition.
24 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970).
25 SEC RELEASE at 2.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
29 Id. at 301 (emphasis supplied).
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ably that pyramidal sales plans do not come under the Howey definition,
since the franchisee must exert some effort himself in order to recruit new
investors. However, the Commission contends that "solely" in the defini-
tion does not really mean "solely," and that, in deciding whether an invest-
ment contract exists, the kind and degree of effort required of the investor
must be considered, lest "the Howey decision.., be permitted to become a
'static principle' easily avoided by ingeniously-devised variations in form
from the particular type of investment relationship described in that
case."
30
The term "security" must be defined in a manner adequate to serve the
purpose of protecting investors. The existence of a security must depend
in significant measure upon the degree of managerial authority over the
investor's funds retained or given; and performance by an investor of
duties related to the enterprise, even if financially significant and plain-
ly contributing to the success of the venture, may be irrelevant to the ex-
istence of a security if the investor does not control the use of his funds
to a significant degree. The "efforts of others" referred to in Howey
are limited, therefore, to those types of essential managerial efforts but
for which the anticipated return could not be produced.31
The significance of the Commission's ruling that franchise agreements
such as that sold by DG and similar pyramid sales plans are securities as
defined in the Securities Act of 1933 is, of course, that the agreement
must be registered with the Commission unless an exemption is available."
In addition, any person who participates in the distribution of the fran-
chises may be required to register as a broker under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.'3 Also, companies and franchisees who engage in decep-
tive acts and practices in connection with the offer or sale of a pyramid
franchise would violate the antifraud provisions of both the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.a- Obviously, alluding
to Koscot and DG, the Commission states that the sales promotions of such
companies "may be inherently fraudulent."a"
Under these programs, various cash fees and percentage incentives are of-
fered to those willing to participate as an inducement for the recruit-
ment of additional participants. This aspect of the promotion is often
given great emphasis at "opportunity meetings" at which movies may be
shown and speeches made concentrating on the allegedly unlimited po-
tential to make money in a relatively short period of time by recruiting
others into the program. Since there are a finite number of prospective
participants in any area, however, those induced to participate at later
30 SEC RELEASE at 3.
31id.
32 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970); SEC RELEASE at 1.
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a) (4), 78o(a) (1) (1970); SEC RELEASE at 1.
34 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c)(1) (1970); SEC RELEASE at 1.
35 SEC RELEASE at 4.
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stages have little or no opportunity for recruitment of further persons.
It is patently fraudulent to fail to disclose these factors to prospective in-
vestors. Even where some disclosure of these practicalities is made, more-
over, it may be made in a manner that misleadingly fails to note the
significance to the participants of the facts disclosed. In the Commis-
sion's view, use of this inherently fraudulent device to induce investment
in any enterprise offering securities to the public is a violation of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws. 30
In May, 1972, the SEC brought its first court action against a pyramid
company, asking the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon to enjoin DG from offering its franchises until it complied with the
securities laws." Specifically, the SEC alleged that the DG scheme in-
volves the offer and sale of securities as to which no registration statement
is in effect or has been filed, in violation of sections 5(a) and 5 (c) of
the Securities Act of 1933,"s and that in connection with the offer and
sale of securities, DG is violating the antifraud provisions of section 17 (a)
of the Securities Act of 1933,39 and of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193440 and Rule lob-5 thereunder. 41 The Commission
asked for both a preliminary and a permanent injunction, and moved for
an accounting and appointment of a temporary receiver to take control
of all assets possessed by defendants which have been received as a result
of the complained-of acts.42
On August 30, 1972, Judge Skopil, after making detailed findings of
fact, held that DG franchise agreements are described by three separate
categories of the definition of "security" contained in the Securities Act of
1933."3 First, the court held that the agreement is an "interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security,' ",44 since it meets the "risk capital"
36 ld.
3T SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., CCH FED. SEC L REP. 1 93,606 (D. Ore,
Aug. 30, 1972); N.Y. Times, May 18, 1972, at 8, col. 1. In addition to this case, at least
16 private actions seeking damages from Turner Enterprises, Koscot, or DG have been filed
on behalf of disenchanted investors in various federal district (ourts. These cases, many of
which are dass actions, are based on various theories of both federal and state law. As of
this writing, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has issued to all parties an order to
show cause why all the cases should not be transferred to a single district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1497 (1970). Order to Show
Cause, In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation, No. 109 (Judicial Panel on Multidis.
trict Litigation, filed June 7, 1972).
38 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (1970).
39 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
40 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
41 17 C.F.R. § 240.101-5 (1972).
4 2 Complaint, SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., CCII FED. Snc. L Rin,, 5 93,606
(D. Ore. Aug. 30, 1972).
-3 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., CCH FlD. S n. L. REP, 1 93,606 (D. Ore.
Aug. 30, 1972). The findings so closely parallel the writer's observations of DG's marketing
practices in Ohio that it is apparent that DG has achieved near-total uniformity in method
nationwide.
44 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970).
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test first adopted by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobrieski.5 This test, since adopted in many states, "recognize[s]
that the subjection of the investor's money to the risk of an enterprise
over which he exercises no managerial control is the basic economic reality
of a security transaction." 46
In holding that a DG franchise agreement is also an "investment con-
tract," 47 the court found that "the most essential consistency in the
cases [including Howej,] which have considered the meaning of 'invest-
ment contract' is the emphasis on whether or not the investor has sub-
stantial power to affect the success of the enterprise."4  In applying the
Howey "solely from the efforts of others" test, the relevant efforts are
"those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success
of the enterprise.- 49 The court thus refused to view Hou'ey as creating
a "litmus test" intended to be literally applied in every case, since such
an interpretation "would inevitably lead to the exploitation of loopholes
created by that definition.""0
The court also held that DG sells a "certificate of interest in or partic-
ipation in any profit-sharing agreement,"'' recognizing that, "What the in-
vestors receive, after all, is a right to a cut of the profits from other inves-
tors."5 2  Under this interpretation of the statutory language, an agreement
to share in particular, designated profits is as much a "profit-sharing agree-
ment" as is an agreement to share all profits.
The Court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting DG from sell-
ing or offering to sell Adventures III and IV until compliance is had with
the securities laws.5 3 Thus, pending a final decision on the merits, or
45 55 Cal. 2d 811,361 P.2d 906,13 Cal. Rprr. 186 (1961).
4 6 CCH FE. SEc. L REP. 5 93,606, at 92,791. Judge Skopil notes that the "commonly
known as" language of the federal act has not previously been interpreted.
41 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970).
48 CCH FED. SEC L pEp. 5 93,606, at 92,792.
49 Id.
o CCH FED. Ssc L REP. 5 93,606, at 92,791.
5' 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970).
52 CCH FBI). SEC. L REp. 5 93,606, at 92,793.
53 Id. at 92,794. However, the court denied the SEC's request for an accounting and appoint-
ment of a temporary receiver, since there was no showing that either Turner Enterprises or DG
was insolvent or that such relief was otherwise appropriate. Id.
Glenn Turner's response was to threaten to split DG into 500 companies and, if neces-
sary, to give them away. "I want to see the federal and state governments go after 500 com-
panies," he said. Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1972, at 8, col 1. In a statement, attorneys for DG
said that they planned to appeal, and warned that Judge Skopil's decision, if upheld, would
".. . shake the business community to its foundations and cause a wide variety of business
operations to be Labeled a security." Id. The attorneys were evidently referring to "stan.
dard" commercial franchise agreements, which they presumably do not want regulated by the
SEC. On the other hand, Harold Brown (author of Franchising: Fraud, Conccalmcns and Full
Disclosure, 33 Omo ST. I.J. 517 (1972)) fears that
in the rush to condemn these particular systemns [pyramid franchise schemes], both the
courts and administrative agencies are falling into the trap of making the "pyramid
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intervention by another forum, DG is presently shut down all across the
country.
The State of Ohio, as well as other states having similar blue sky laws,
has likewise proceeded against pyramid plans on a securities theory. In
June 1969, the Ohio Division of Securities issued a cease and desist order
to Koscot, finding that the franchises were "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Ohio Securities Act, 4 and ordering Koscot to halt the offering
of franchises in Ohio until it complied with the registration" and dealer
licensing" requirements of the Act.
In July, 1969, Koscot franchisees sought a declaratory judgment to the
effect that Koscot franchises are not securities, and an order enjoining the
Division of Securities from enforcing its cease and desist order.51 In
September, 1969, since Koscot allegedly had not complied with the order
but had continued to operate as before,"" the Division of Securities sought
an order enjoining Koscot from offering its franchises for sale until it
complied." The case squarely presented the issue of whether or not the
Koscot franchises are "securities" within the meaning of the Ohio Secu-
rites Act, which provides that
"Security" means any ... instrument which represents title to or in-
terest in, or is secured by any lien or charge upon, the capital, assets,
profits, property, or credit of any person .... It includes ... written in-
struments in or under profit-sharing or participation agreements .. .
[and] any investment contract .... 60
The argument of the Division of Securities may be outlined as fol-
lows: Koscot franchises are securities under either of two possible tests.
First, blue sky laws, including the Ohio Securities Act, have a remedial
purpose. They are to be interpreted to provide full and adequate protection
for the investing public. Therefore a broad test to determine whether
or not a security exists is whether the investor is exposed to the risk of
scheme" the far lines of demarcation [of the reach of the securities laws], with either
the expressed or implied distinction of "regular franchises."
Letter from Harold Brown to Robert L. Beals, Sept. 8, 1972 (on file in the Ohio State Law Jour-
nal office).
54 OHO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.01-.45 (Page 1964).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.08-.10 (Page 1964).
50 OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.14-.15 (Page 1970 Supp.).
57 As previously suggested, Koscot and DG are very similar in structure and methods of
operation, although they deal in different ultimate products (mink oil-base cosmetics versus
motivation courses). Koscot's several levels of distributorships correspond to the Adventure
levels in DG. Turner founded Koscot in 1967 and DG in 1970, and many former Koscot
franchisees are now Dare To Be Greaters.
58 Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 237612 (C.P.,
Franklin County, April 17, 1972).
59 This procedure is authorized by OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.25-.26 (Page 1964).
00 O111 REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Page 1970 Supp.).
[Vol. 33
FRANCHISE SYMPOSIUM
loss of his original investment. Several recent decisions indicate that the
"risk of loss" test is receiving increasing sanction.61
The second, more complex test for a security, formulated by Professor
Coffey, focuses upon the "economic realities" of the particular transaction6 2
The "economic realities" test in pertinent part, may be stated as follows:
A "security" is:
(1) A transaction in which
(2) a person ("buyer") furnishes value ("initial value") to another
("seller"); and
(3) a portion of initial value is subjected to the risks of an enterprise,
it being sufficient if-
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose present value
is determined by taking into account the anticipated but unrealized suc-
cess of the enterprise, even though the buyer has no legal relationship
with the enterprise; and
(4) at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar with the
operations of the enterprise or does not receive the right to participate in
the management of the enterprise; and
(5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above initial value, will accrue
to the buyer as a result of the operation of the enterprise.0
Comparing Koscot's method of operation with the "economic realities" test,
Koscot franchises fall under this definition of "security." First, a fran-
chisee furnishes initial value to Koscot in the form of the franchise fee.
Next, that part of the fee representing the right to recruit new franchisees
and thereby earn commissions is subjected to the risks of the enterprise
(Koscot), in that "the success of an individual... [franchisee] in realizing
this anticipated value depends almost entirely on the over-all success of the
Koscot program, especially the regimented Golden Opportunity Meeting
presentation."'  At trial, the Division attempted to show that "investors
6 1 Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 5, 9, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 237612 (C.P.,
Franklin County, April 17, 1972). Cases cited include Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobie-
ski, 55 Cal.2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (memberships in planned
country club); Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii
1971) (founder-membership in planned retail store); and Florida Discount Centers, Inc- v.
Antinori, 226 So.2d 693 (Fla. App. 1969), affd 232 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1970) (store's customers
earned finder's fees on referral sales).
62 Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 237612 (C.P.,
Franklin County, April 17, 1972).
63Id. at 8-9, quoting Coffey, The Economic Rcalitics of a "Se urt: I There a Afore
Meaningful Formula, 18 W. RES. L REv. 367,377 (1967) (footnote omitted).
64 Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 9, Supplemental Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 12-13, Wedren v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 237612 (C.P., Franklin County, April 17, 1972). This is
substantially the same test used by the SEC to label pyramid sales plans investment contracts.
See text accompanying note 26 supra. The Division of Securities relied heavily on the SEC
RELEASE in its argument Trial Brief, supra at 5-8, 11, 15; Supplemental Trial Brief, upra
at 13.
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in Koscot were completely at the mercy of the corporation in Florida and
that their success or failure in the enterprise was dependent upon factors
over which they had no control." 65  Evidence was introduced tending
to show that "the Company emphatically directed the ... (franchisees]
not to give any details of the program to a prospect before a Golden Op-
portunity Meeting," but to do nothing more than bring the prospect to the
meeting, and let the speakers and group enthusiasm do the selling. 0
The Division also introduced evidence to show that franchisees were told
to dress well, drive an expensive car and act successful regardless of
whether or not they were; "this display of success was designed to en-
hance the appeal of the Golden Opportunity Meeting where the actual
'pitch' was made to the prospects." '67  The next element of the "economic
realities" test is satisfied because Koscot neither provides new franchisees
with any financial information about the company , nor are they ac-
corded the right to participate in the management of the company. 0 Fi-
nally, the new franchisee's payment of the franchise fee is induced by
Koscot's representations that he would earn more than enough money, by
recruiting new franchisees, to recoup his original investment. 9 The
Division concluded that since all the criteria of the "economic realities"
test are met, a Koscot franchise is a security.70
The Division was at pains to point out that this is not a normal fran-
chise where the franchisee pays a franchise fee for the right to retail a cer-
tain product. The Koscot franchisee receives that right, but the emphasis
is on the money which a franchisee can make from selling more fran-
chises identical to his own, not from the sale of product.7'1
In addition to arguing that Koscot franchises are "investment con-
tracts," the Division also contended that the franchises constitute "profit-
sharing or participation agreements," and thus fit within a second category
of securities under the Ohio Act.72 Evidence showed that a Director (who
corresponds to the Adventurer IV in the DG hierarchy) receives a ten
percent override on all sales made by his retail organization, and a two
percent override on all sales made by the retail organization of a Super-
65 Supplemental Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 7, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No.
237612 (C.P., Franklin County, April 17, 1972).
(16ld. at 5-6.
67Id. at 6.
681d. at 11-13.
69 Id. at 13.
70 d.
71 [Tjhe printed Koscot agreement was cleverly drafted so as to exclude specific ref-
erence to the 'wholesaling' of distributorships. Yet, even the Company's own wit-
nesses readily admitted... that a person signing one of the agreements was there-
by entitled to sell distributorships and receive the concomit-t finder's fees and
overrides, Id. at 7. See text accompanying note 5, supra.
72 OHIo R . CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Page Supp. 1970).
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visor, originally sponsored by the Director, who later moves up to become
a Director.73
In contending that Koscot franchises are not securities and that their
sale is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Securities, Kos-
cot argued as follows: In Howey, 4 the Supreme Court of the United
States construed the term "investment contract" to mean, for purposes of
the Securities Act of 1933, upon which the Ohio Act is patterned,
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party....7r
A Koscot franchisee can earn money in two ways by recruiting and train-
ing a sales organization, thereby earning a wholesaler's margin and over-
rides on sales made by his people, and by recruiting new franchisees,
thereby earning finder's fees.76 A franchisee who sets up a sales orga-
nization must, to be successful, expend a great deal of effort in recruiting
and training his people. His income can no more be said to come to him
solely through the efforts of others than can that of any person or firm
which purchases products for resale. Therefore, only the right to receive
finders fees for sponsoring other franchisees in the program could possibly
be construed as an investment contract. This too requires recruiting effort
on the part of the franchisee. In any event, the right to earn finder's fees
is an incidental benefit, since a franchisee can earn a profit on his invest-
ment by setting up, training and supplying his own sales force.7 Evi-
dence was introduced to show that all the franchisees were told that they
would have to work to make money, that there were no "free lunches."7"8
Not only is a Koscot franchise not an investment contract, under the
Howey test, for purposes of the Ohio Securities Act; but also is not a profit-
sharing or participation agreement for purposes of that Act. A franchisee
does not receive profits based on the amount of his investment or based
on the overall success or failure of Koscot. His earnings are based solely
on his own efforts and the efforts of his sales organization. 0
In response to Koscot's basic contention that its franchises are not
securities, since franchisees have to exert significant efforts to make money
in the "retail" end (recruiting and training a sales organization), the Di-
73 Supplemental Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 5-6, 14, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanctay, Inc.,
No. 237612 (C.P., Franklin County, April 17, 1972).
74 SECv. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
75328 U.S. at 298-99.
"8 Similarly, the DG franchisee can earn commissions by "retailing!' Adventure I and II
courses or finder's fees by recruiting new IIl's and IV's.
77 Supplemental Trial Brief for Defendant at 6-17, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
No. 237612 (C.P., Franklin County, April 17, 1972).
781 d. at 5.
7" Id. at 8.
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vision of Securities argued that the "retail" part of the plan is mere win-
dow-dressing for the pyramid scheme. According to Division witnesses,
prospects were lured to invest in the program by representations that they
could make vast incomes from recruiting other franchisees, and once they
had invested, they received instruction at the training sessions in "head
hunting.""s The Division contended that the only effort required of the
franchisee is finding prospects to bring to Golden Opportunity Meetings
where the "pitch" is given, and that the franchisee is told not to disclose
any details about the company prior to the meeting. The Division con-
cluded that this effort was minimal and completely unrelated to the os-
tensible business purpose of the company, retailing cosmetics. 8' Thus, in
response to Koscot's argument that under the Howey test a Koscot fran-
chise is not an investment contract subject to the Ohio Securities Act be-
cause a franchisee must expend significant effort himself in order to realize
profits, the Division contended that
[u]nlike the citrus grove program underlying Howey, th: Koscot plan was
a highly promotional enterprise which emphasized the money to be made
from the sale of distributorships-the latter being a highly intangible
benefit which depended only minimally upon the investor's efforts for
Success .... 82
Therefore, the Howey pronouncement that an investment contract is pres-
ent only where the investor's profits come solely from the efforts of others
is "inapposite to the facts of the instant case."83
The trial court held that Koscot had been engaging in the sale and of-
fering for sale of securities for purposes of the Ohio Securities Act, and
permanently enjoined their offering unless and until Koscot complies
with the provisions of the Act.84 The opinion contained no findings of
fact. Koscot plans to appeal from the decision.8"
The practical effects of the holding that an investor in Koscot is pur-
chasing a security are twofold. In order to offer franchises for sale in Ohio,
80 Supplemental Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 4-5, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No.
237612 (C.P., Franklin County, April 17, 1972).
81 Id. at 6-7. A Division witness testified that Glenn Turner's brother, while teaching a
training dass, told the franchisees present to pencil the following admonition in their Golden
Opportunity Meeting "scripts" because "the State was giving us trouble":
But keep this in mind while we are talking, there is no such reality as something for
nothing, and if this is what you are looking for, you will not find it with Koscot.
Work and knowledge are required to earn the kind of money we are talking about.
Id, at 9-10. The Division cited this testimony as "further evidence cf the fact that the Com-
pany's protestations as to the amount of work necessary constitutes a glorification of form over
substance .... " Id. at 9.
82 Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 237612 (C.P.,
Frankiin County, April 17, 1972).
Said.
84 Wedren v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 237612 (C.P., Franklin County, April 17,
1972).
85 Interview with Willard Dobbs, counsel for Koscot, in Columbus, Ohio, April 21, 1972.
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Koscot must comply with the registration provisions of the Ohio Securi-
ties Act,86 and each franchisee who wishes to recruit new franchisees must
qualify as a licensed dealer.8 7  Compliance with these requirements pre-
sumably affords a measure of protection to the prospective investor. In
addition, there appears to be a remedy for those who have already in-
vested. The Act provides that a sale of a security made in violation of its
provisions is voidable at the election of the purchaser. 5 The seller, and
every person who has participated in the sale or aided the seller in any
way, are liable to the purchaser for the purchase price of the security, un-
less the violation did not materially affect the protection contemplated by
the violated provision.8 Although an investor must bring an action
within two years of the date of purchase in order to qualify for automatic
rescission, ° many investors should be able to take advantage of this pro-
vision of the Act.
B. Consumer Protection Statutes
Many states have proceeded against pyramid sales plans under various
types of consumer protection statutes. Because New York has statutes
which empower the courts to enjoin fraudulent or deceptive business prac-
tices on application of the Attorney General,"' DG, Koscot and Glean
Turner consented to a judgment under which they are: (1) enjoined from
representing to prospective franchisees that they can readily earn large
sums of money, without disclosing the number of franchisees i. New York
who actually earn such sums, how much the average franchisee earns,
and other material facts including operating expenses; (2) ordered to af-
firmatively disclose all relevant material facts to prospective franchisees
if representations are made as to any material facts; (3) ordered to notify
each person who purchased a franchise in New York that if he can demon-
strate that he purchased such franchise in reliance upon misrepresentations
or material omissions of the companies or their franchisees, and has suf-
fered damage as a result, that the companies will make restitution of
his damages up to the price of the franchise, -02 and ordered to make resti-
tution to all persons thus entitled; (4) enjoined from offering or selling
franchises pending the giving of the required notification; and, (5) en-
joined from otherwise violating the provisions of the statutes. 3
8 6 
mo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.08-.10 (Page 1964).
87 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.14-.15 (Page 1964).
8 8 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Page 1964).
89 Id.SOld.
90 Id.
9 1 NY. EXEc. LAw § 63.12 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinwy
Supp. 1971).
92 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
93 Sate v. Kos=ot Interplanetary, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Cr. for N.Y. County, Dec. 1, 1970), deft.
motion to set aside judgment denied May 7, 1971, aff'd, 327 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (App. Div. 1972).
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In an affidavit in support of the state's complaint, an Assistant Attor-
ney General in charge of the investigation, who had himself attended
Opportunity Meetings conducted for prospects by both companies, stated
among other things, that: (1) Koscot represented to prospects that it
was not unusual for a franchisee to earn $100,000 per year; (2) DG told
prospects that franchisees could earn $240,000 per year and could earn a
"guaranteed income" of $50,000 per year; (3) Koscot -told speakers at
"Opportunity Meetings" to dress well, buy a Cadillac, and tell prospects
that they are making a great deal of money, in order to induce them to
join the program; (4) at "Opportunity Meetings" checks for large sums
of money were waved before prospects who were told that such amounts
are typically earned by franchisees in one week; (5) prospects were told
that the number of available franchises in New York was limited, and that
they should buy in quickly before they were sold out; (6) some pros-
pects were told that a Deputy Attorney General of another state who
was investigating Koscot became so impressed with the company that he
quit his job and bought a franchise; and (7) in contrast to these misrepre-
sentations, only 79 of the 1064 Koscot franchisees in New York have made
more than $5,000 and only 10 have made more than $20,000 during the
first ten months of 1970, which amounts have come from the sale of fran-
chises, not product. 4 "What is . . . not told is that if all of the people
in the program were to make the promised $100,000 per year, even with
retail sales, at the end of the first year at least 150,000 new distributorships
would have to be created and at the end of the second year New York
alone would have to have 150 million distributors." 95
In February 1972, more than a year after the consent judgment, New
York again went to court, this time asking that Koscot, DG and Turner
be held in contempt for wilfully failing to comply with the provisions of
the consent judgment. A Special Deputy Attorney General states in his
affidavit in support of the contempt motion that Koscot and DG con-
tinue -to mandate and teach the same "scripts" for Opportunity Meetings
and the "closing" of prospects, containing the very misrepresentations
barred by the court's- judgment, that they continue to use a pyramid sales
plan, which the State contends is inherently deceptive and therefore pro-
hibited by the judgment, that both companies still represent to prospects
that astronomical incomes can be earned by selling franchises, while fail-
ing -to disclose average earnings and the number of persons earning large
sums, that they continue to fail to disclose to prospects the existence of
certain charges imposed by the companies which reduce the profits of
9 4 Affidavit of Stephen M. Leon (Nov. 27, 1970), State v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. for N.Y. County, Dec. 1, 1970).
95 Id. at 7.
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franchisees, and that they have failed to make restitution as ordered.5
As of this writing, the defendants have been ordered to show cause why
they should not be held in contempt?
The California Attorney General proceeded successfully against Koscot
under that state's "endless chain" statute. In February 1971, Koscot
and Turner Enterprises, among others, consented to a judgment under
which they were permanently enjoined from: (1) using a pyramid sales
plan (under a rather complex formula, finder's fees on sales of new fran-
chises are to be held in trust until the new franchisee produces a certain
amount of retail product sales); (2) paying a commission to a sponsoring
franchisee unless the new franchisee receives extensive training in busi-
ness and retail sales; (3) requiring a franchisee to purchase any products
or pay any consideration other than payment for the actual cost (to Kos-
cot) of necessary sales materials, except that if Koscot requires a fran-
chisee to purchase an initial inventory of product it must agree to repur-
chase it within sixty days at 35 percent of retail price; (4) soliciting
prospects without informing them orally and in writing that they may can-
cel the franchise agreement within three days of its execution, by notify-
ing Koscot either orally or in writing; (5) making any false, deceptive or
misleading representations to prospects; (6) representing to prospects
that they can earn a stated amount of money unless such amount repre-
sents the average earnings based on retail sales of one-third of all Koscot
franchisees in the United States, or unless Koscot concurrently discloses
the average earnings based on retail sales of a substantial number of fran-
chisees within a particular geographical area; (7) representing past earn-
ings of franchisees without concurrently disclosing the average retail sales
earnings of a substantial number of franchisees in the same geograph-
ical area of the exemplary franchisee; (8) representing, directly or by
implication, that it is not difficult for franchisees to recruit new franchisees;
(9) representing directly or by implication, that it is not difficult for a
franchisee to recruit retail sales personnel, or that it is not difficult to sell
any minimum amount of Koscot products to the public; (10) repre-
senting, directly or by implication, that it is not difficult for a franchisee to
advance to a higher distribution level, or that a franchisee will succeed;
and (11) representing, directly or by implication, that the supply of
96Affidavit of Sheldon Horowitz (undated), State v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. (N.Y. Sup.
Ci for N.Y. County, Dec. 1, 1970).
97 Order to Show Cause (Jan. 31, 1972), State v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. for N.Y. County, Dec. 1, 1970).
98 Cr. PENqAL CODE § 327 (West 1970). The statute provides that
an "endless chain" means any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property where-
by a participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance to receive compensaton
for introducing one or more additional persons into participation in the scheme or for
the chance to receive compensation when the person introduced by the participant
introduces a new participant.
The operation of an "endless chain" scheme is made a misdemeanor.
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potential franchisees or retailers is unlimited. It was further ordered
that: (1) speakers at Opportunity Meetings who are not franchisees shall
orally disclose the precise nature of their association with Koscot, and,
if they are entitled to receive any compensation for recruiting franchisees,
they shall disclose that they are "salesmen" and the amount of their
commissions; (2) Koscot shall disclose at each Opportunity Meeting all
expenses which it is known franchisees may be required to incur in that
capacity, and their approximate amounts, for example, sales tax permit or
business license, warehousing, or retail product promotion; (3) within ten
days of entry of judgment, Koscot shall disclose in writing the terms of
the judgment to all franchisees and agents, and shall secure from each a
signed, notarized statement that he has read and understands such dis-
closure; (4) Koscot shall obtain a similar signed statement from each
prospective franchisee prior to his signing any agreement; (5) if such
signed, notarized statement is not obtained prior to the time a prospect
becomes a franchisee, he shall at any time have the rights of cancellation
and complete refund of his total investment under all contracts with Kos-
cot; (6) any such claim for refund may, at the option of the claimant,
be settled by arbitration; (7) within ten days, Koscot shall notify each of
its franchisees that if he is of the opinion that any part of Koscot's mar-
keting program was misrepresented to him, he shall have, within 60 days
of receipt of such notice, the right to demand the immediate refund of
all money which he has paid to Koscot under any agreement; and (8)
the Attorney General's office shall have access to Koscot's books for the
purpose of securing compliance with the judgment 9 In May 1972, the
Attorney General instituted contempt proceedings against Koscot, which
subsequently entered into a stipulated order requiring Koscot to offer re-
funds to several hundred California investors. 10 Pursuant to that order,
California investors have recouped more than $500,000 from Koscot.10'
In September, 1971, the Attorney General of California brought an
even more ambitious injunctive action against DG, Glenn W. Turner En-
terprises, Inc., and Koscot,1°2 seeking, in effect, to shut them down in
California, on three theories: (1) that they violate the "endless chain"
statute;10 3 (2) that they are engaged in unfair competition, fraudulent
business practices, and false or misleading advertising in violation of con-
09 People v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc, No. 112912 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., Feb.
16, 1971).
100 Order (July 27, 1971), People v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., No. 112912 (Kern Coun-
ty, Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 16, 1971).
101 Letter from Michael J. Kelly, Deputy Attorney General of the State of California, to
Harry M. Cochran, Jr., May 10, 1972 (on file in the Ohio State Law Journal office).
102 People v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., No. 636-555 (San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Sept. 13, 1971).
103 CAL PENAL CODE § 327 (West 1970). See text accompanying note 98 supra,
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sumer protection statutes; 04 and (3) that they have not complied and prob-
ably cannot comply with the registration provisions of the Franchise In-
vestment Law.' 5 This action is still pending.
In Ohio the recently enacted Consumer Sales Practices Act'e" appears
on its face to forbid the operation of pyramid sales plans. It prohibits
inducing a consumer to enter into a transaction by offering him a bene-
fit for his help in entering into subsequently-completed consumer transac-
tions. 07 Although the language of the statute is specifically directed at
the practice of referral sales, 08 it should be equally applicable to pyramid
sales plans, since the same potential danger to the consumer inheres in
both situations. The vacuum cleaner purchaser who is promised a ten
percent kickback for every sale made from leads he provides, and the DG
prospect who pays $5000 for a motivation course have in common the
induced belief that they are paying for not only a product, but future in-
come which will be generated by the efforts of the seller. This belief
leads each to pay more for the product than it alone is worth. In addi-
tion to the referral sales provision, the new Act prohibits the commis-
sion, in connection with a consumer transaction, of acts or practices which
are either deceptive0 9 or unconscionable," 0 both of which adjectives argu-
ably fit specific practices utilized in the marketing of DG franchises.
The Act empowers the Department of Commerce to adopt rules de-
fining practices which violate the Act,"' and to request the Attorney Gen-
eral to investigate probable violations."- The Attorney General is au-
thorized to bring actions for either declaratory or injunctive relief against
alleged violators, and to bring class actions for damages on behalf of
104 CAL Civ. CODE § 3369 (West 1970); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 19&4).
105 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West Supp. 1972).
'
0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-.13 (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2). The
Act became effective on July 14, 1972.
1-0 7 No supplier shall offer to a consumer or represent that a consumer will receive a
rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer trans.
action in return for giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers, or
otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer transactions, if earning
the benefit is contingent upon an event occurring after the consumer enters into the
transactions.
OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2) A "consumer
transaction" includes the sale of a franchise. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Page
1972 Current Service No. 2).
'
0 8 The comment to the virtually identical section of the Uniform Consumer Sales Prac-
tices Act, from which the Ohio Act derives, merely states that "(t]his subsection forbids re-
ferral commission arrangements in which a consumer is to receive future commissions bawed
upon events which occur after the time at which he enters into a related consumer transa=-
tion." UNIFORm( CONsuiER SALEs PRACncEs AcT § 3(b)(11), Comment.
10 0o1O REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02 (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2).
to OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2).
" OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B)(2) (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2).
-12 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2).
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injured consumers."' In addition, the Act creates a private cause of ac-
tion for rescission of the transaction or actual damages. 1 4
On August 29, 1972, the Attorney General filed a complaint against
DG and Turner Enterprises alleging violations of the referral sales, un-
conscionability, and deception provisions of the Consumer Sales Practices
Act." 5 Judge August Pryatell of the Cuyahoga County Court of Com-
mon Pleas issued a temporary restraining order enjoining DG and
Turner Enterprises from conducting any operations in Ohio. 110
IV. CONCLUSION
For Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., and for other pyramid sales
plans, the wick is growing short. Since incorporating Koscot in 1967,±
Glenn Turner has amassed a personal fortune estimated at $150 million,
and heads a holding company with 68 subsidiaries and annual sales of $200
million."" He has achieved such astounding success by beginning
with the endless chain concept, the possibilities of which have always
fascinated people, and grafting thereto a highly sophisticated marketing
vehicle, the GO Tour, which many people are unable to resist. His suc-
cess, and that of a relatively small minority of investors, has come at the
expense of thousands of people who were swept into the venture on a
tide of optimism, faith, and perhaps greed, and who have been subsequent-
ly lowered, more gently or less, into reality, thousands of dollars poorer.
Turner contends that he is being "persecuted as part of a national plot to
put him out of business,"" 0 and such indeed appears to be the case.
Harry M. Cochran, Jr.
Oa mo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.07(A) (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2).
"4 OHIo RE V. CoDE ANN. § 1345.09 (Page 1972 Current Service No. 2).
115 Complaint, Brown v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., No. 909403 (C.P., Cuyahoga County, filed
Aug. 29, 1972).
110 Interview with David N. Brown, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, in Columbus,
Ohio, August 31, 1972; Columbus Evening Dispatch, Aug. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 7.
117 J. FPASCA, CON MAN OR SAINT 113 (1970) (an extremely favorable biography of
Glenn Turner).
"
8 Tobias, Do You Sincerely Want To Give Glenn Turner Your Money?, NEw YoRK,
Feb. 28, 1972, at 27. This is the best of the many popular artid.es about Turner and his en-
terprises.
119 N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1972, at 45, col. 5. Turner was referring not only to the civil
actions lodged against his companies, but to criminal actions brought against him individually,
In his home state of Florida, for example, he has been charged with sale of unregistered se.
curities and failure to register as a securities dealer, Id., and with conspiracy to commit fraud,
conspiracy to violate the state lottery law, and conspiracy to violate the state securities act.
N.Y. Times, May 8, 1972, at 35, col. 1.
